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Assessing the taskforce’s report and the 
proposed bill, I suggest, requires us to 
answer three primary questions:
• Is there an issue with the current 
state of New Zealand’s legislative and 
regulatory system – the process of 
legislation – and the results of that 
system – the substance of legislation 
– that requires a solution? The 
taskforce’s terms of reference did not 
require it to address this issue, but it is 
a question that inevitably arises from 
the initiative.2
• If there is an issue, does the guidance 
of selected principles, both procedural 
and substantive, with which legislation 
and the legislative process should 
comply provide at least a partial 
answer to that issue?
• Are the mechanisms proposed by the 
taskforce to encourage early, thorough 
and transparent consideration of those 
principles likely to be effective, and 
consistent with New Zealand’s public 
law arrangements?
To answer those questions a range of 
expertise and experience must be brought 
to bear, by lawyers, economists, and those 
with in-depth experience of the legislative 
process. In that context, it is appropriate 
to recall the diversity of professional 
experience captured by the taskforce’s 
membership. That membership included 
people with extensive experience in 
business, law and economics. Most 
importantly, the taskforce also included 
those whose primary experience has been 
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Introduction
Together with another of my Chapman Tripp colleagues, 
Colin Fife, I provided support to the Regulatory 
Responsibility Taskforce and assisted in the preparation 
of the taskforce’s report. Graham Scott, the chair of the 
taskforce, proposed that I participate in this symposium. 
In this capacity, I obviously do not speak for the taskforce, 
which has itself disbanded.1 The report of the taskforce 
must speak for itself, without elaboration. Rather, I offer 
my perspective, as a person who was ‘in the room’ with the 
taskforce during its deliberations, on what I take as the major 
legal themes emerging from the taskforce’s report and the 
proposed bill.
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in the public sector, both as legislators 
and as senior advisers to legislators. It 
also bears mentioning that two members 
of the taskforce had experience on the 
Legislation Advisory Committee (LAC), 
one as a former chair whose tenure 
coincided with the last major revision 
of the LAC guidelines. The taskforce 
thus included experience that covered 
the entire life cycle of legislation: from 
policy development, drafting legislation, 
advocating for (and against) legislation 
and implementing legislation, to litigating 
questions arising from legislation and 
advocating for its reform. That range of 
experiences was critical in developing the 
proposals in the bill.
With that emphasis on experience 
in mind, I turn briefly to the first two 
questions raised by the taskforce’s report: 
is there a problem, and are legislated 
principles the solution?
Is there an issue?
The starting point for the taskforce – a 
majority of submitters to the commerce 
committee considering the original bill, 
from a wide range of backgrounds – 
agreed that:
• there were real and important 
problems with the quality of 
legislation produced by the current 
law-making processes;
• current non-legislative initiatives were 
not capable of producing the change 
in quality desired; and accordingly
• a legislative solution was required.
That view was shared by the taskforce. It 
concluded, in its report, that:
as matters of principle and 
practicability, there can and should be 
less legislation and better legislation; 
and second, the existing constitutional 
and operational framework cannot 
be expected to deliver those outcomes 
without significant change. (para 1.3)
I leave it to others to debate that 
assessment. I would, however, note that 
at least one eminent New Zealander has 
previously suggested that, as least as far 
as delegated legislation is concerned, 
there is an issue worth addressing. 
Geoffrey Palmer, in his review of the use 
of delegated legislation in New Zealand 
in 1999, concluded that regulatory 
interventions in the form of secondary 
and tertiary legislation:
should be more carefully judged 
than they are in New Zealand. The 
New Zealand Government system 
still lacks both an intellectual and 
practical framework for arriving at 
those judgments within the Executive 
Government system. … [t]here are 
dangers in entrusting too much 
power to public agencies. (Palmer, 
1999, p.36)
A brief comparison of Palmer’s 
description of matters in 1999 with 
the present day suggests that similar 
comments could be made about 
delegated legislation now. In 1995, 461 
regulations were formally published in 
the New Zealand Statutory Regulations, 
apparently a record then (ibid., p.2). 
The record still stands but it is routinely 
threatened: in 2008, 456 regulations 
were published. Moreover, the book of 
delegated legislation is getting noticeably 
thicker. While the 1999 statutory 
regulations were housed in three volumes, 
seven volumes were necessary in 2009.
The scope of regulation has also 
expanded. The rejection of light-handed 
regulation since Palmer wrote has led to 
increasingly complex industry-specific 
economic regulation. Much of the 
detail of that regulation is determined 
not by parliament but by ministers 
and regulatory agencies. The effect of 
the recent amendments to part 4 of 
the Commerce Act 1986 reinforces this 
approach.
A statement of principles as the solution?
Consistent with the views of a majority 
of submitters to the commerce select 
committee, the taskforce’s terms of 
reference established it to ‘carry forward 
the Commerce Committee’s work on the 
[Regulatory Reform Bill]’, to ‘determine 
what, if any, amendments to the Bill 
would best achieve its objectives’ and 
to produce a report that, inter alia, 
‘recommends a draft Bill’.
The proposed bill has, at its core, an 
elevation of principles covering both 
substantive and procedural matters 
which have previously either been 
tacitly assumed to guide the legislative 
process, or have expressly guided the 
process through the LAC guidelines or 
the Regulations Review Committee, to 
legislative status. Those principles are 
then reinforced by various mechanisms 
designed to encourage early, thorough 
and transparent consideration of policy 
proposals and draft legislation against 
those principles.
The matters addressed by the 
principles were well stated in the forward 
to the 2001 revision to the advisory 
committee guidelines by Margaret 
Wilson, when she said:
We must –
ask whether legislation is needed 
to give effect to the policy which 
the Government is planning to 
implement;
follow proper procedures in preparing 
the legislation, in particular by 
consulting appropriately outside 
Government and within it;
ensure that the legislation complies 
with established principles, unless 
there is good reason for departing 
from them.
The inclusion or exclusion of 
particular principles within the proposed 
bill, and the precise formulation of those 
principles, is itself a substantial topic. 
It should be no surprise that, in the 
commentary to the bill in the taskforce’s 
report, the commentary on clause 7 is 
... there is merit in the statement of the principles being, 
to the extent possible, short, expressed in plain English 
and self-contained.
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the same length as that for the rest of 
the bill combined. Here, I make only 
two general comments, before turning to 
the primary novelty in the bill – that the 
mechanisms encourage consideration of 
the principles.
The first comment is that there is merit 
in the statement of the principles being, 
to the extent possible, short, expressed 
in plain English and self-contained. If 
the object is for the principles to guide 
policy development, and not merely act 
as a checkbox at the end of the process, 
it is unrealistic to expect policy makers, 
who are expected to have their primary 
field of expertise in some other area, to 
internalise an overly elaborate statement. 
This is an area in which the LAC 
guidelines can be validly criticised. The 
2001 edition of the guidelines runs to 
480 pages; the checklist at the beginning 
comprises six pages of text, in a small font 
size, and contains 92 separate questions 
to be addressed.3 Further, some of those 
questions are not self-explanatory. 
For example, question 3.1 requires the 
legislator to ask: does the legislation 
comply with fundamental common law 
principles? To obtain insight into what 
are to be regulated as ‘fundamental’, the 
policy analyst must turn to chapter 3. 
There, there are 16 separate principles 
listed across two and a half pages. In 
comparison, clause 7 of the bill takes 
two and a half pages of legislative text. 
Not all concepts are capable of simple 
expression, of course, but, as a short 
form text for policy makers to commit 
to head (if not to heart), it is largely self-
contained and relatively digestible.
The second is that it is important, 
in assessing the impact of the bill, to be 
accurate in stating what the principles 
will and will not achieve. The principles 
are not absolutes. They are, first, able to 
be justifiably departed from under clause 
7(2), to the extent that it is reasonable 
and can be demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society. Second, 
even thus limited the principles are only 
matters that legislation should comply 
with, not that legislation must comply 
with. To accurately assess the utility of 
the principles, those limitations must be 
recognised.
Are the mechanisms appropriate?
The bill, though, does more than provide 
a statement of principles. It also includes 
three legislative mechanisms designed to 
encourage early, thorough and transpa-
rent consideration of the principles in 
the policy development and legislative 
process: certification, interpretation 
and declarations of incompatibility. 
Each requires justification. However, 
before addressing those mechanisms, it 
is worthwhile emphasising what the bill 
does not do:
• It does not set up the principles as 
supreme law, in respect either of acts 
or of delegated legislation.
• It does not set up a process which 
can result in any injunctive or 
monetary relief for non-compliance 
by legislators or their advisers.
• It does not set up a judicially 
enforceable process for evidence-
gathering in the legislative 
process, or otherwise increase the 
intensity of judicial review of even 
delegated legislation (effectively the 
United States position under the 
Administrative Procedure Act 1946).
• It does not set up new specialist bodies 
to review legislation, and complaints 
concerning legislation.
Aside from the two limited respects in 
which a judicial role is allowed for, the bill 
explicitly limits judicial consideration of 
legislation against the principles. Clause 
14 provides that the principles do not have 
force of law (except as provided in relation 
to interpretation and the declaratory 
jurisdiction), and no court may decline 
to apply any provision by reason only 
that the provision is incompatible with 
the principles, or any provision of the bill 
has not been complied with. Clause 13 in 
turn expressly limits the effect of any 
declaration, and excludes any judicial 
remedies in respect of the certification 
process.
I turn to the mechanisms contained 
in the bill.
Certification
The first and primary mechanism 
by which the bill seeks to encourage 
consideration of the principles is 
certification. The bill (clauses 8 and 
9) requires both those who propose 
legislation (the minister responsible for 
a government bill, or the member in the 
case of a member’s bill) and those who 
would administer it to certify:
• whether the legislation is compatible 
with each of the principles;
• if not, in what respects, and whether 
the incompatibility is justified (with 
reasons); and
• if the incompatibility is not justified, 
the reasons for proceeding in the 
absence of justification. 
Those last two matters are, where 
possible, reserved for politically 
accountable actors.
The certification process is intended 
to assist in the quantity and quality of 
informed debate concerning proposed 
legislation. In this informational 
purpose, the certification requirements 
serve a function similar to the 
requirement that the attorney-general 
report inconsistencies between the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act and proposed 
bills to the House (New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990, section 7). However, in 
requiring those who propose legislation 
... the certification requirements serve a function 
similar to the requirement that the attorney-general 
report inconsistencies between the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act and proposed bills to the House
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... the taskforce concluded that the availability of a 
judicial remedy, even if in a declaratory, non-binding 
form, would provide the necessary political ‘teeth’ to 
encourage ministers and their advisers to carefully 
consider compliance of legislative proposals with 
the principles, and whether any inconsistencies are 
justified. 
(and their principal advisers) to execute 
certificates, the certification provisions 
serve a broader, and potentially more 
significant, function, by placing a political 
and/or moral responsibility for confirming 
compatibility (or not) with the principles 
on those who are responsible for the 
policy-making process itself.
When one is asked to sign a document, 
one is more inclined to read it carefully, 
and make certain of its truth. That sense 
of personal responsibility engendered by 
certification is intended both to encourage 
law makers to take seriously the question 
of the compatibility of their proposals 
with the principles, and to encourage 
their advisers – who will be asked the 
inevitable question, ‘can I sign this?’ – to 
be in a position to answer that question 
by taking early account of the principles 
in their policy development process.
It is interesting to observe that the 
Australian state of Victoria, in passing 
their Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006, has taken a 
similar approach. The Victorian Charter 
is, like our New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act, not supreme law. Under the Charter 
a reasoned Statement of Compatibility is 
obligatory from the person introducing 
the bill (sections 29, 36, 28; see Williams, 
2006, p.880). Justice Kirby has at a recent 
conference indicated that the view of the 
chief parliamentary counsel for Victoria 
is that in her experience the certification 
process has been the greatest benefit 
of the Charter (Kirby, 2010). Similarly, 
certification can be regarded as the 
primary mechanism contained in the 
bill to encourage early, thorough and 
transparent reasons for legislation.
Interpretation
The second mechanism proposed by the 
bill – in clause 11 – is the requirement 
that, for all new legislation, wherever an 
enactment can be given a meaning that 
is compatible with the principles (after 
taking into account clause 7(2)), that 
meaning is to be preferred (clause 11(1)). 
The language of this clause is expressly 
taken from section 6 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act, to enable the significant 
body of precedent developed under 
that section to be available to the courts 
in approaching clause 11. The primary 
significance of this clause, I suggest, is to 
create a ‘preference eliciting rule’, as that 
term is used by American commentators 
in discussing common law canons of 
construction (Elhauge, 2002, p.2162; see 
also Elhauge, 2008). The classic example 
of a preference-eliciting rule is the rule 
that ambiguity in criminal statutes should 
be construed against the defendant. It 
is difficult to contemplate a legislative 
preference for this result. However, the 
effect of the default rule is that legislators, 
faced with the predictable default rule, can, 
and are encouraged to, carefully calibrate 
their choice of legislative language to 
define the scope of conduct desired to be 
criminalised.
Under clause 11 a similar analysis is 
possible for legislation that is incompatible 
with, for example, the principle concerning 
liberties (clause 7(1)(b)), or the taking of 
property (clause 7(1)(c)). Indeed, such 
a preference-eliciting default rule in 
relation to legislative takings already exists 
in common law (Manitoba Fisheries Ltd 
v The Queen [1979] 1 SCR 101), which is 
why legislation with that effect routinely 
includes a ‘no compensation’ clause.
The interpretative default rule of clause 
11 encourages careful consideration and 
selection of legislative language to codify 
a determination that an incompatibility 
with the principles is justified under clause 
7(2). The opportunity to undertake that 
consideration applies only to legislation 
passed after the enactment of the bill: the 
bill expressly limits clause 11 directive to 
legislation passed after bill comes into 
force; in the case of pre-existing legislation 
the bill provides for a 10-year window for 
review (clause 11(3)).
Such a default rule might be 
objectionable if there was a substantial risk 
that the judiciary, in seeking a principles-
consistent interpretation, would calibrate 
the default rule such that legislative 
preference could not overcome the default 
position. The risk of such judicial over-
reaching is, however, in my view, limited, 
for three reasons.
First, a clear difference in approach has 
emerged between the courts of the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand courts. The 
New Zealand approach to section 6 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, confirmed 
recently by the Supreme Court in R v 
Hansen, is that the courts will not consider 
giving legislation a meaning other than 
that produced by ordinary legislative 
techniques unless that normal meaning 
constitutes an unjustified incompatibility 
with the principles and an alternative 
meaning is available.4 Second, even if that 
approach to section 6 is subsequently 
revisited, the approach in R v Hansen, and 
the consequential divergence from the UK 
courts, is noted and endorsed in relation 
to clause 11 of the Regulatory Reform Bill 
by the taskforce’s report. That reference 
can be expected to assist in entrenching 
that approach in respect of the bill.5
Third, and perhaps most importantly, 
in contrast to the position usually faced by 
the courts in interpreting legislation under 
section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act, a court 
faced with a claim that legislation should 
be given a particular meaning by virtue of 
clause 11 of the bill will have the assistance 
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of the pre-enactment certifications. That 
will both clarify legislative purpose, and 
provide a basis for the court to defer to 
legislative judgment on any determination 
of whether an incompatibility is justified.
Declaration of incompatibility
The third mechanism proposed in the 
bill is the creation of special jurisdiction 
for the High Court to grant a declaration 
of incompatibility. Clause 12 of the 
bill provides that a ‘Court may, in 
any proceedings’, defined as limited 
proceedings for a declaratory judgment 
or judicial review, ‘declare that a provision 
of any legislation is incompatible with 1 or 
more of the principles specified in clauses 
7(1)(a) to (h), unless the incompatibility 
is justified under section 7(2)’. As with 
the other mechanisms proposed, two 
related questions arise in relation to the 
proposed jurisdiction: is it necessary, and 
is it appropriate?
On the first question, the view of the 
taskforce, and in particular the advice 
of the members of the taskforce with 
significant experience as senior advisers 
to ministers and elsewhere within 
government, was that the certification 
process alone would likely be insufficient 
to encourage serious consideration being 
given to the principles in the legislative 
process. The taskforce concluded that:
The experience of the Taskforce strong-
ly suggests that guiding principles 
(including, but not limited to, the 
LAC Guidelines), when not reinforced 
with meaningful consequences in the 
event of non-compliance, are unlikely 
to achieve significant adherence. 
(paragraph 4.121)
Here, the taskforce concluded that the 
availability of a judicial remedy, even if in 
a declaratory, non-binding form, would 
provide the necessary political ‘teeth’ to 
encourage ministers and their advisers to 
carefully consider compliance of legislative 
proposals with the principles, and whether 
any inconsistencies are justified. Whether 
that assessment is correct must be for 
others, particularly those with experience 
in government at the highest levels, to 
judge. I note only that the experience 
of the members of the taskforce was 
reinforced by its consultation within the 
public service.
I turn to the second question, 
whether the grant of a jurisdiction to 
grant declarations of incompatibility 
is appropriate, and, in particular, 
whether it is compatible with New 
Zealand’s public law arrangements. It 
is necessary to say something briefly 
about the doctrine of ‘parliamentary 
sovereignty’. The relative merits of that 
doctrine as a way of understanding New 
Zealand’s constitutional arrangements 
is, of course, controversial (see, for 
example, Goldsworthy, 2005). Happily, 
it is not necessary to enter into that 
debate in considering the taskforce’s 
recommendations. To the extent that the 
doctrine has a meaning, it must be that 
Parliament has unfettered ability to make 
and unmake laws. That ability is expressly 
preserved by the bill. 
Given that the bill preserves formal 
parliamentary sovereignty, there seem to 
me to be two possible functional objections 
to the jurisdiction (see Elias, 2004): 
• first, that, notwithstanding preserva-
tion of de jure parliamentary 
sovereignty, the de facto position is 
that there will be a transfer of law-
making power to the courts, because 
legislators will have a tendency to 
unquestioningly adopt the courts’ 
advice;
• second, that the questions required 
to be answered in the jurisdiction 
are inappropriate for judicial 
determination (either because 
answering the question is harmful 
to the judicial role or the judiciary 
has nothing useful to say given its 
institutional limitations).
The first point may be shortly dealt 
with. The possibility of a declaration of 
incompatibility must have some political 
or moral force for law makers, otherwise 
there is no point in its inclusion in the bill. 
At the same time, a de facto transfer of the 
ultimate legislative power from the law 
makers to the judiciary on the issues dealt 
with by the bill is not desirable. On this 
issue, balance is required. In fact, however, 
the New Zealand experience with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act suggests that 
this is unlikely. Andrew Geddis’s recent 
study of the effect of the Bill of Rights 
Act on the legislative process persuasively 
argues that New Zealand politicians have 
not been substantially cowed by the threat 
of judicial remonstrance in enacting 
legislation that is inconsistent with the 
rights stated in act (Geddis, 2009). Petra 
Butler reached a similar conclusion in her 
earlier analysis.
As to the second objection, the concept 
of the courts having an institutional 
role as non-binding ‘advisers’ to the 
legislature on constitutional issues 
is not a new one (Varuhas, 2009). In 
Westminster democracies that role has 
been played by courts in the context of 
‘parliamentary bills of rights’ for at least 
20 years. Of course, there remains the 
question of whether any advice received 
from the court is likely to be useful. The 
institutional disadvantages faced by courts 
in considering issues of social policy are 
well known: the adversarial system is 
ill-equipped for consideration of broad 
poly-factorial policy questions; courts 
lack necessary expertise and the means 
of readily obtaining it; they also suffer a 
democratic deficit (at least in comparison 
with Parliament). However, to assess 
the significance of those institutional 
disadvantages it is necessary to consider 
the questions that will be asked of the 
judiciary under the bill. In fact, I suggest 
that none of the questions actually to 
be asked of the court raises significant 
institutional disadvantages that cannot be 
overcome through the application of well-
established doctrines.
In considering whether to grant a 
declaration of incompatibility, a court will 
In considering whether to grant a declaration of 
incompatibility, a court will be faced with three 
questions. 
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be faced with three questions. The first is an 
issue of interpretation: what is the proper 
interpretation of the principle concerned. 
That is plainly a matter to which the 
judiciary is not only suited, but has special 
expertise. The second is a mixed question 
of law and fact: is the legislative measure 
proposed in fact inconsistent with the 
principle, properly interpreted. Here, the 
exclusion of certain principles from the 
jurisdiction is important. No declaration 
of incompatibility with the principles 
of good law making can be made other 
than in respect of the principle that, to 
the extent practicable, the persons likely 
to be affected have been consulted. Thus, 
no declaration of incompatibility can be 
sought on the basis that:
• there has not been a careful evaluation 
of the necessity for a legislative 
response to an issue;
• the legislation does not produce 
benefits that outweigh the costs of the 
legislation; or
• the legislation is not the most effective, 
efficient and proportionate response 
to the issue concerned.
These were matters not regarded by 
the taskforce as being suitable for judicial 
consideration; plainly, any consideration 
of whether particular legislation was in 
breach of those principles would require 
the sort of poly-factorial analysis to which 
the courts are ill-suited. The remaining 
principles, I suggest, are capable of judicial 
application, and the questions that arise 
(for example, the meaning of ‘impairment’ 
in clause 7(1)(c)), are likely to be primarily 
questions of interpretation. Moreover, in 
the most part the remaining principles are 
matters that the courts are already asked 
to apply to legislation through the existing 
common law canons of construction.
The third question for the courts will 
be, if there is an incompatibility, whether 
that incompatibility is ‘reasonable, and 
justified in a free and democratic society’ 
under clause 7(2). This would seemingly 
threaten to move the court into territory 
beyond its core institutional competencies. 
However, in addressing the same question 
in considering parliamentary bills of rights, 
the courts have developed a jurisprudence 
of ‘deference’ to legislative judgment that 
recognises and seeks to mitigate those 
difficulties. As Tipping has explained in R 
v Hansen, under the equivalent provision 
in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act:
the Courts perform a review function 
rather than one of simply substituting 
their own view. How much latitude 
the Courts give to Parliament’s 
appreciation of the matter will depend 
on a variety of circumstances. There is a 
spectrum which extends from matters 
which involve major political, social 
or economic decisions at one end to 
matters which have a substantial legal 
content at the other. The closer to the 
legal end of the spectrum, the greater 
the intensity of the Court’s review is 
likely to be.6
At least two matters suggest that 
the New Zealand courts are likely to 
give appropriate deference to legislative 
judgments on whether incompatibilities 
with the bill’s principles are justified. First, 
the courts are likely to be more insistent 
on process (including consideration of 
justification in terms of the Oakes test) than 
on substance. The extent to which the law-
making body has rendered a ‘considered 
opinion’ on the issue is likely to determine 
in part the level of deference given.7 If a 
certification, or any additional statement 
provided to the court under clause 12(2)
(a), provides through reasoning for the 
legislative judgment, that is more likely 
to attract deference. The courts’ approach 
can therefore be expected to encourage 
transparent consideration and thorough 
weighing of the issues.
Second, many of the principles are 
likely to be regarded by the courts as 
falling towards the opposite end of 
Tipping’s spectrum to that occupied by 
fundamental human rights. The principles 
concerned with economic values, such as 
compensation for takings, are in practice 
routinely limited, as distinct from rights 
not to be tortured or tried unfairly, or 
even the right of free speech.8 Further, 
in the field of economic regulation the 
courts currently show marked deference 
to regulators.9
An example from the United Kingdom 
illustrates the likely approach. In the 
Countryside Alliance case10 the House 
of Lords was called on to consider a 
challenge to the United Kingdom’s ban 
on fox hunting under article 1 of the first 
protocol to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. That provision establishes 
a right to ‘peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions’. The pro-hunting advocates 
claimed, successfully, that this right to 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions was 
engaged by the ban, as land could not be 
used for hunting and owners of businesses 
associated with hunting had lost goodwill. 
Nonetheless, the House of Lords 
unanimously held that the ban was justified 
and proportional. The moral objection to 
inhumane treatment of animals was an 
appropriate policy objective, and given 
that the interference in property was slight, 
the ban was a proportionate response 
to that objective. The speeches of their 
lordships emphasise that in reaching this 
conclusion, significant deference was due 
to the recently expressed democratic will 
of the legislature. Lord Bingham stated:
Here we are dealing with a law which 
is very recent and must (unless and 
until reversed) be taken to reflect the 
conscience of a majority of the nation. 
… The present case seems to me to be 
pre-eminently one in which respect 
should be shown to what the House 
of Commons decided. The democratic 
process is liable to be subverted if, 
on a question of moral and political 
judgment, opponents of the 2004 Act 
achieve through the courts what they 
could not achieve in Parliament.11
In short, the New Zealand judiciary is well aware 
of its institutional limitations, and has developed 
mechanisms to avoid inappropriate substitution of 
judicial judgment for legislative assessment. 
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In short, the New Zealand judiciary is 
well aware of its institutional limitations, 
and has developed mechanisms to avoid 
inappropriate substitution of judicial 
judgment for legislative assessment. What 
is likely to attract judicial attention is not 
poor quality legislation in substance, but 
a poor quality process: where principles 
have not been addressed or have 
simply been glossed over, and credible 
alternatives which are more consistent 
with the principles have either not been 
assessed or have been casually dismissed 
without evidence or logic. The likely 
judicial approach to the declaratory 
jurisdiction is therefore one which 
reinforces both the certification regime 
and the ultimate objective: that legislators 
and their advisers give early, thorough and 
transparent consideration to the principles 
in developing legislation.
Conclusions
To conclude, I suggest not answers to the 
questions I proposed at the outset, but 
four tentative observations:
First, that the bill proposed by the 
taskforce has a heritage in previous law 
reform in both New Zealand and in other 
jurisdictions. While the ultimate proposal 
is a novel one, most if not all of the 
mechanisms that comprise that proposal 
are not. That provides us with, in most 
cases, practical experience on which to 
draw in assessing the likely impact of the 
proposed bill.
Second, but related to that first 
point, that in assessing the impact 
of the taskforce’s recommendations, 
practical expectations based, to the 
extent possible, on experience are more 
relevant than theoretical predictions 
based on Madisonian insights as to the 
self-aggrandising nature of public actors.12 
Here, the characteristics of New Zealand’s 
political and legal culture – what Matthew 
Palmer has referred to as ‘New Zealand 
constitutional culture’ (Palmer, 2007) – 
must be taken into account, particularly 
when reference is had to the experience of 
other jurisdictions.
Third, that while it is perhaps natural 
that a primary focus should rest on the 
bill’s impact on parliamentary processes, 
that should be resisted. The bill’s 
proposals are equally aimed at delegated 
legislation, and their appropriateness 
and effectiveness should be assessed in 
relation to all legislative acts to which the 
bill applies.
Finally, it is important to recall the 
rationale for the taskforce’s creation. 
That was that a majority of submitters to 
the commerce select committee held the 
view that there was an issue of quality 
with New Zealand’s body of legislation 
and with its policy-making process, and 
that a legislative process which placed 
greater incentives on law makers and 
their advisers to deliver quality policy and 
legislation was desirable. If that remains 
true, then the taskforce’s proposals are 
worthy of serious consideration.
1 The standard qualification that the views expressed in this 
article are those of the author alone therefore apply with 
particular force to the taskforce.
2 In this article I use the term ‘legislation’ in the sense it is 
used in the report and bill, to cover all primary, secondary 
and tertiary legislation promulgated by public agencies – 
essentially all statutory agencies of central government.
3 http://www2.justice.govt.nz/lac/pubs/2001/legislative_
guide_2000/combined-guidelines-2007v2.pdf
4 R v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [60] – [61] per Blanchard 
J; [92] per Tipping J; [191] per McGrath J; [266] per 
Anderson J (SC).
5 See Ports of Auckland v Southpac Trucks Limited [2009] 
NZSC 112, at [26]: ‘in order to comprehend the scheme 
and intended operation of the Carriage of Goods Act it is 
necessary to have full regard to the intentions of the Law 
Reform Committee on whose work the Act is based.’ 
6 R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7; [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [116] per 
Tipping J.
7 R v Hansen, above, at [118]. See, for example, R v 
Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15, where JFS’s 
policy was held to be unjustified indirect discrimination 
by Lord Mance in part because of the ‘absence of any 
actual consideration or weighing of the need [to pursue the 
school’s aim] against the seriousness of the detriment to the 
disadvantaged group’ (at [100]).
8 R v Hansen, above at [65] per Blanchard J.
9 Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission [2008] 1 
NZLR 42 at [54] (SC). See also Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v 
Auckland District Health Board [2009] 1 NZLR 776, at 
[366] (CA). 
10 [2008] 2 All ER 95 (HL).
11 R (on the application of the Countryside Alliance) v Attorney 
General, above, at [45].
12 Federalist No 47, No 48 (1787).
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